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INCOMPLETENESS AND JUMP HIERARCHIES
PATRICK LUTZ AND JAMES WALSH
Abstract. This paper is an investigation of the relationship between Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem and the well-foundedness of jump hierarchies.
It follows from a classic theorem of Spector’s that the relation tpA,Bq P R2 :
OA ďH Bu is well-founded. We provide an alternative proof of this fact that
uses Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem instead of the theory of admissible
ordinals. We then derive a semantic version of the second incompleteness
theorem, originally due to Mummert and Simpson, from this result. Finally,
we turn to the calculation of the ranks of reals in this well-founded relation.
We prove that, for any A P R, if the rank of A is α, then ωA
1
is the p1 ` αqth
admissible ordinal. It follows, assuming suitable large cardinal hypotheses,
that, on a cone, the rank of X is ωX
1
.
1. Introduction
In this paper we explore a connection between Gödel’s second incompleteness the-
orem and recursion-theoretic jump hierarchies. Our primary technical contribution
is a method for proving the well-foundedness of jump hierarchies; this method cru-
cially involves the second incompleteness theorem. We use this technique to provide
a proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 1.1. There is no sequence pAnqnăω of reals such that, for each n, the
hyperjump of An`1 is hyperarithmetical in An.
This theorem is an immediate consequence of a result of Spector’s, namely that
if OA ďH B then ω
A
1 ă ω
B
1 (so the existence of such a sequence pAnqnăω would
imply the existence of a descending sequence ωA0
1
ą ωA1
1
ą . . . in the ordinals).
We provide an alternative proof that makes no mention of admissible ordinals, and
which has the additional benefit of showing the theorem is provable in ACA0.
Here is a brief sketch of how our alternative proof works: Consider the theory
ACA0 `DS where DS is a sentence asserting the existence of a sequence of reals as
described in Theorem 1.1. We work inside the theory and let A0, A1, . . . be such
a sequence. ACA0 proves that if the hyperjump of a real exists then there is a
β-model (a model that is correct for Σ11 sentences) containing it. In this case O
A1
exists so there is a β-model containing A1. Moreover, since all An’s for n ě 1 are
hyperarithmetical in A1, the β-model will contain all of them. All β-models are
models of ACA0 (in fact, ATR0) so it appears this model is a model of the theory
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ACA0`DS, meaning that the theory proves its own consistency. By Gödel’s second
incompleteness theorem, this implies that ACA0 proves  DS.
There is one problem, however. Just because the model contains all the elements
of the sequence pAnqně1 does not mean it contains the sequence itself (here we are
thinking of the sequence as a single real whose slices are the An’s). Indeed, the
sequence itself could be much more complicated than any single real in the sequence.
In our proof, we overcome this flaw by showing that if there is a descending sequence
then there is a descending sequence that is relatively simple—in fact there is one
that is hyperarithmetic relative to A1. This means the β-model above really does
contain a descending sequence.
In [3], H. Friedman uses similar ideas to prove the following theorem originally due
to Steel:
Theorem 1.2 (Steel). Let P Ă R2 be arithmetic. Then there is no sequence
pAnqnăω such that for every n,
(i) An ěT A
1
n`1 and
(ii) An`1 is the unique B such that P pAn, Bq.
In these proofs we move from the second incompleteness theorem to the well-
foundedness (or near well-foundedness) of recursion-theoretic jump hierarchies. In
fact, the implication goes in both directions: the well-foundedness of appropriate
jump hierarchies entails semantic versions of the second incompleteness theorem.
For example, theorem 1.1 yields a simple and direct proof of the following seman-
tic version of the second incompleteness theorem originally due to Mummert and
Simpson (recall that L2 is the standard two-sorted language of second order arith-
metic):
Theorem 1.3 (Mummert–Simpson). Let T be a recursively axiomatized L2 theory.
For each n ě 1, if there is a βn-model of T then there is a βn-model of T which
contains no countable coded βn-models of T .
In fact, our proof sharpens the Mummert-Simpson result somewhat by dropping
the requirement that T be recursively axiomatized.
A different semantic version of the second incompleteness theorem also follows from
theorem 1.2, as observed by Steel in [10]. Namely, the following:
Theorem 1.4 (Steel). Let T be an arithmetically axiomatized L2 theory extending
ACA0. If T has an ω-model then T has an ω-model which contains no countable
coded ω-models of T .
These results all point to a general connection between incompleteness and well-
foundedness. Elucidating this connection is the central goal of this paper. Though
many of the theorems we prove could also be proved from the application of known
methods, we believe that the new techniques are more conducive to achieving our
central goal. Additionally, our techniques are able to prove somewhat sharper
results than the original methods.
We also investigate directly the well-founded hierarchy at the center of theorem
1.1. It follows from that theorem that the relation A ă B defined by OA ďH B is
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a well founded partial order. We call the ă rank of a real its Spector rank. There
is a recursion-theoretically natural characterization of the Spector ranks of reals:
Theorem 1.5. For any real A, the Spector rank of A is α just in case ωA1 is the
p1` αqth admissible ordinal.
It follows, assuming suitable large cardinal hypotheses, that, on a cone, the Spector
rank of X is ωX1 .
Here is our plan for the rest of the paper. In §2 we describe related research.
In §3 we prove the main theorem. In §4 we provide an alternative proof of the
Mummert-Simpson theorem. In §5 we turn to the calculation of Spector ranks.
2. Second Incompleteness & Well-Foundedness
The second incompleteness theorem implies the well-foundedness of various struc-
tures (in particular, sequences of models). In turn, the well-foundedness of struc-
tures sometimes yields a semantic version of the second incompleteness theorem (in
the form of a minimum model theorem). It is worth emphasizing that the former
argument does not rely on the theory of transfinite ordinals and the latter argument
does not rely on self-reference or fixed point constructions. This point allows us to
sharpen certain results. Because we avoid the use of ordinals, we can verify that
Theorem 1.1 is provable in ACA0; because we avoid self-reference, we can drop the
restriction in the statement of Theorem 1.3 that T be recursively axiomatized.
We will now describe both types of arguments, describe their historical antecedents,
and point to related research.
2.1. Well-foundedness via incompleteness.
To derive well-foundedness from incompleteness we work in the theory T` “there is
a descending sequence,” where T is sound and sufficiently strong. We build a model
of T containing a tail of the sequence, yielding a consistency proof of T` “there
is a descending sequence” within the theory T` “there is a descending sequence.”
By the second incompleteness theorem, this means that T proves that there are no
descending sequences.
The main difficulties lie in building a model that is correct enough that if a descend-
ing sequence is in the model, the model knows it is descending and in finding a T
that is strong enough to prove the model exists but weak enough that the model
built satisfies it.
As far as we know, the first arguments of this type are due to H. Friedman. We
were inspired, in particular, by H. Friedman’s [3] proof of a theorem originally due
to Steel [10].
Theorem 1.2 (Steel). Let P Ă R2 be arithmetic. Then there is no sequence
pAnqnăω such that for every n,
(i) An ěT A
1
n`1 and
(ii) An`1 is the unique B such that P pAn, Bq.
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Steel’s proof is purely recursion-theoretic, whereas Friedman’s proof appeals to the
second incompleteness theorem. In particular, Friedman supposes that there is an
arithmetic counter-example P to Steel’s Theorem. He then works in the theory
T :“ RCA` “P produces a descending sequence” and uses P to build ω-models of
arbitrarily large fragments of T . This yields a proof of ConpT q in T , whence T is
inconsistent by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
Recently, Pakhomov and the second named author developed proof-theoretic ap-
plications of this technique in [8]. They show that there is no sequence pTnqnăω
of Π11 sound extensions of ACA0 such that, for each n, Tn proves the Π
1
1 soundness
of Tn`1. This result is proved by appeal to the second incompleteness theorem,
though it could be proved by showing that a descending sequence pTnqnăω of the-
ories would induce a descending sequence in the ordinals (namely, the associated
sequence of proof-theoretic ordinals). They also show that, “on a cone,” the rank
of a theory in this well-founded ordering coincides with its proof-theoretic ordinal.
These results are strikingly similar to the main theorems of this paper.
2.2. Incompleteness via well-foundedness.
Here is an informal argument for incompleteness via well-foundedness. Suppose
that second incompleteness fails, i.e. that a consistent T proves its own consistency.
If T also proves the completeness theorem, then every model M of T has (what it is
by the lights ofM) a model within it. This produces a nested sequence of models. If
these models can be indexed by ordinals, then this produces a descending sequence
of ordinals. So the well-foundedness of the ordinals produces some form of the
second incompleteness theorem. If we know that the models form a well-founded
structure, we can argue directly, without the detour through the ordinals.
To sharpen this argument one must know that the objects that are “models of T ”
in the sense of M are genuinely models of T . So one must restrict one’s attention
to structures that are sufficiently correct. In addition, one must clarify the relation
by which the models are being compared and prove that it is well-founded.
An early argument of this sort is attributed to Kuratowski (see [5, 6]). Set theory
cannot prove the following strong form of the consistency of set theory: that there
is an α such that Vα is a model of set theory. For if it does then there is α such
that Vα is a model of set theory. Since Vα is a model of set theory, there is also a
β ă α such that Vβ is a model of set theory. Iterating this argument produces an
infinite descending sequence of ordinals. Contradiction.
Steel has also developed an argument of this sort. Using his Theorem 1.2, he
demonstrates that if an arithemtically axiomatized theory of second order arith-
metic extends ACA0 and has an ω-model then it has an ω-model which contains no
countable coded ω-models of the theory.
2.3. Kripke structures.
We conclude this discussion of related work with the following observation. Formal-
ized in the language of modal logic, the statement of Gödel’s second incompleteness
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theorem characterizes well-founded Kripke frames. Indeed, the formalization cor-
responds to the least element principle:
♦ϕÑ ♦pϕ^ ♦ϕq
Its contrapositive, a modal formalization of Löb’s theorem, corresponds to induc-
tion:
lplϕÑ ϕq Ñ lϕ
Beklemishev has suggested that this observation is connected with ordinal analysis.
In [1], he uses a modal logic of provability known as GLP to develop both an ordinal
notation system for ε0 and a novel consistency proof of PA.
3. The Main Theorem
In this section we provide our alternative proof of Theorem 1.1.
3.1. Outline of proof.
In broad strokes, here is our strategy. We will consider a statement DS which states
that there is a descending sequence in the hyperjump hierarchy. We then work in
the theory ACA0`DS and derive the statement ConpACA0`DSq. By Gödel’s second
incompleteness theorem, this implies that there is a proof of  DS in ACA0.
To derive ConpACA0 ` DSq in ACA0 ` DS, we use the hyper jump of a real to
construct a coded β-model of ACA0 containing that real. In particular, if we are
given a descending sequence then we can use the existence of the hyperjump of the
second real in the sequence to find a β-model containing all the elements of the
tail of the sequence. The point is that the tail of a descending sequence is again a
descending sequence and β-models are correct enough to verify this.
The only problem is that while the β-model we found contains all the elements of
the tail it may not contain the tail itself (i.e. it may not contain the recursive join
of all the elements of the tail). Our strategy to fix this is to essentially to show that
there is a family of descending sequences which is arithmetically definable relative
to some parameter whose hyperjump exists. A β-model containing this parameter
must then contain an en element of this family (because β-models contain witnesses
to all Σ11 statements).
For the parameter, we will use a countable coded β-model which contains a tail of
the original descending sequence. The arithmetic formula will then essentially say
that the β-model believes each step along the sequence is descending. The point
is that we have replaced a Π11 formula saying the sequence is descending by an
arithmetic formula talking about the truth predicate of some coded model and that
β-models are correct enough that this does not cause any errors.
The β-model will just come from the existence of the hyperjump of some element
of the original sequence, and we can guarantee the hyperjump of the model exists
by taking one more step down the original descending sequence.
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3.2. Useful facts.
In this section, we record the facts about β-models that we will use in the proof of
the main theorem. Unless otherwise noted, proofs of all propositions in this section
can be found in [9].
Definition 3.1. A β-model is an ω-model M of second order arithmetic such that
for any Σ11 sentence ϕ with parameters in M , M ( ϕ if and only if ϕ is true.
Proposition 3.2 ([9], Lemma VII.2.4, Theorem VII.2.7). Provably in ACA0, all
countable coded β-models satisfy ATR0 (and hence also ACA0).
Proposition 3.3 ([9], Lemma VII.2.9). Provably in ACA0, for any X, O
X exists
if and only if there is a countable coded β-model containing X.
Proposition 3.4. All of the following can be written as Boolean combinations of
Σ11 formulas and hence are absolute between β-models
(1) A is the hyperjump of B.
(2) A ďH B
(3) M is a countable coded β-model.
3.3. Proof of the main theorem.
Theorem 1.1. There is no sequence pAnqnăω of reals such that, for each n, the
hyperjump of An`1 is hyperarithmetical in An.
Proof. It suffices to prove the inconsistency of the theory ACA0 ` DS, where
DS :“ DX@npOXn`1 exists and OXn`1 ďH Xnq.
To do this, we reason in ACA0`DS and derive ConpACA0`DSq. The inconsistency
of ACA0 ` DS then follows from Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
Reasoning in ACA0 ` DS:
Let A witness DS. That is, for all n, OAn`1 exists and OAn`1 ďH An. Our goal is
now to show there is a model of ACA0 ` DS.
Claim. There is a countable coded β-model M coded by M such that OM exists
and M contains An for all sufficiently large n.
The proof of Proposition 3.3 in [9] actually shows that for any X , if OX exists
then X is contained in a countable coded β-model which is coded by a real that is
recursive in OX . So A2 is contained in some countable coded β-model M, coded by
M , such that M ďT O
A2 ďH A1. Hence O
M ďT O
A1 . Since OA1 exists, so does
OM . And since M is closed under hyperarithmetic reducibility, M contains An for
all n ě 2.
Claim. There is an arithemtic formula ϕ such that
(i) DX ϕpM,Xq
(ii) For any X, if ϕpM,Xq holds then X is a witness of DS
where M is as in the previous claim.
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Basically ϕpM,Xq says that X is a sequence of reals whose elements are in M and
for each n, M believes that OXn`1 exists and is hyperarithmetical in Xn. More
precisely ϕpM,Xq is the sentence
@n pXn`1, Xn PM^M ( “DY rY “ O
Xn`1 ^ Y ďH Xns”q.
To see why ϕpM, Xq has a solution, recall that M contains An for all n sufficiently
large. Let X be the sequence A but with the first few elements removed so that
M contains all elements in X . For each n, the fact that A is a witness of DS
guarantees that there is some Y such that OXn`1 “ Y and Y ďH Xn. Since M
contains Xn and since β-models are closed under hyperarithmetic reducibility, M
contains Y . And by proposition 3.4, β-models are sufficiently correct that M (
“Y “ OXn`1 ^ Y ďH Xn.”
Suppose X is a sequence such that ϕpM,Xq holds. Then for each n there is a
Y such that M ( “Y “ OXn`1 ^ Y ďH Xn.” By proposition 3.4, both clauses
of the conjunction are absolute between β-models. Hence OXn`1 exists and is
hyperarithmetical in Xn. So X is a witness of DS.
Claim. There is a model of ACA0 ` DS.
By proposition 3.3, there is a β-model N that contains M . Since N is a β-model,
by proposition 3.2, it is a model of ACA0.
Since the Σ11 formula DX ϕpM,Xq holds and N is correct for Σ
1
1 formulas with
parameters from N, there is some X in N such that N ( ϕpX,Mq. And since
N is a β-model, it is correct about this fact—that is, ϕpX,Mq really does hold.
Since ϕpM,Xq holds, X is a witness to DS. The point now is just that N is correct
enough to see that X is a witness to DS. In detail: for each n, OXn`1 exists
and is hyperarithmetical in Xn. Since Xn is in N, this means O
Xn`1 is in N.
And by proposition 3.4, N agrees that it is the hyperjump of Xn`1 and that it is
hyperarithmetical in Xn. Therefore N agrees that X is a witness to DS. ❑
Remark 3.5. The previous proof actually demonstrates that ACA0 proves Theorem
1.1. The original Spector proof relies on the theory of admissible ordinals, so it is
unlikely to be formalizable in systems weaker than ATR0.
4. Semantic Incompleteness Theorems
Steel derives the following theorem as a corollary of his Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 1.4 (Steel). Let T be an arithmetically axiomatized L2 theory extending
ACA0. If T has an ω-model then T has an ω-model which contains no countable
coded ω-models of T .
Because ω-models are correct for arithmetic statements, we can restate this as
Corollary 4.1. Let T be an arithmetically axiomatized L2 theory extending ACA0.
If there is an ω-model of T then there is an ω-model of T`“there is no ω-model of T”.
Similarly, we can use Theorem 1.1 to prove the following theorem originally proved
in a slightly weaker form by Mummert and Simpson in [7]. Note that this time we
do not need any assumptions about the theory T .
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Theorem 4.2. Let T be an L2 theory. If there is a β-model of T then there is a
β-model of T that contains no countable coded β-models of T .
Proof. Suppose not. Then every β-model of T contains a countable coded β-model
of T . Let M be a β-model of T . So M contains some countable coded β-model
N0 coded by a real N . Similarly N0 contains a countable coded β-model of T , N1,
coded by a real N1. In this manner we can define a sequence of countable β-models
of T , N0,N1,N2, . . . along with their codes N0, N1, N2, . . .
But for each n, Nn`1 P Nn and since Nn is a β-model it is correct about all Π
1
1 facts
about Nn`1. In other words, O
Nn`1 is arithmetic in Nn. So N0, N1, . . . provides
an example of the type of descending sequence in the hyperdegrees shown not to
exist in theorem 1.1. ❑
In fact, this same proof actually yields a seemingly stronger result. A βn-model
is defined to be an ω-model of second order arithmetic which is correct for all Σ1n
statements with parameters from the model. The same proof as above proves the
theorem mentioned in the introduction (where once again our new proof shows that
the assumption that T is recursively axiomatized can be dropped):
Theorem 1.3 (Mummert–Simpson). Let T be a recursively axiomatized L2 theory.
For each n ě 1, if there is a βn-model of T then there is a βn-model of T which
contains no countable coded βn-models of T .
Since the statement that a real is the code for a βn-model is Π
1
n, βn-models are
correct about such statements. Thus we can restate the above theorem to get the
original version stated by Mummert and Simpson
Theorem 4.3 (Mummert–Simpson). Let T be a recursively axiomatized L2 theory.
For each n ě 1, if there is a βn-model of T , then there is a βn-model of
T+“there is no countable coded βn-model of T .”
5. Spector Ranks
Define a relation ă on pairs of reals by A ă B iff OA ďH B. By theorem 1.1, this
relation is well-founded and therefore reals can be assigned ordinal ranks according
to it. Let’s refer to the ă-rank of a real as its Spector rank. In this section we will
calculate the Spector ranks of reals, showing that we get the same ranks as those
induced by the ω1’s of reals.
We will need to use the following theorem due to Spector:
Theorem 5.1 (Spector). For any reals A and B:
(1) If OB ďH A then ω
B
1 ă ω
B
1 .
(2) If B ďH A and ω
B
1 ă ω
A
1 then O
B ďH A.
We will also need to use the following theorem of Sacks:
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Theorem 5.2 (Sacks). If λ is an admissible ordinal greater than ω and X is a real
such that X computes a presentation of λ (i.e. λ ă ωX1 ) then there is a real Y that
is hyperarithmetical in X such that ωY1 “ λ.
This theorem is typically stated without the requirement that Y is hyperarithmeti-
cal in X , though this is implicit in all or nearly all extant proofs of the theorem.
For instance, in [11] Steel uses the method of forcing with tagged trees to prove
Sacks’ theorem. In that case, the real Y is obtained as the reduct of a generic filter
over Lλ. Since any presentation of λ can hypercompute such a generic (if you can
compute a presentation of λ then it just takes ω ¨ pλ ` 1q jumps to compute the
theory of Lλ), X can hypercompute a Y witnessing Sacks’ theorem.
Using these two theorems, the calculation of Spector ranks follows relatively easily.
Theorem 1.5. For any real A, the Spector rank of A is α just in case ωA1 is the
p1` αqth admissible ordinal.
Remark 5.3. The only reason we need to say p1 ` αqth admissible rather than the
αth admissible is that the way admissible is usually defined, ω is an admissible
ordinal but unlike all other countable admissible ordinals, it is not the ω1 of any
real.
Proof. We will argue by induction on α that for any A if rankpAq ą α then ωA1 is
greater than the p1 ` αqth admissible ordinal and conversely that if ωA1 is greater
than the p1 ` αqth admissible then rankpAq ą α.
First suppose rankpAq ą α. So there is some B of rank α such that OB ďH A.
By Spector’s result, theorem 5.1, this implies ωB1 ă ω
A
1 . And by the induction
assumption, ωB1 is at least the p1 ` αq
th admissible so ωA1 is greater than the
p1` αqth admissible.
Now suppose that ωA1 is greater than the p1 ` αq
th admissible. Let λ denote the
p1 ` αqth admissible. By Sacks’ theorem, there is some B hyperarithmetical in A
such that ωB1 “ λ. Since ω
B
1 ă ω
A
1 , Spector’s theorem implies that O
B ďH A and
hence rankpBq ă rankpAq. By the induction assumption, rankpBq is at least α, so
rankpAq ą α. ❑
Theorem 5.4 (Silver). If α is admissible relative to 07 then α is a cardinal in L.
Hence if X is a real in the cone above 07 then ωX1 is a cardinal in L. Suppose
that ωX1 is the α
th admissible. Since ωX1 is a cardinal in L, it follows that actually
α “ ωX1 “ ω
CK
α . So if 0
7 exists then on a cone, the Spector rank of a real X is
equal to ωX1 .
Theorem 5.5. If 07 exists, then for all A on a cone, the Spector rank of A is ωA1 .
Alternatively, one can infer the previous theorem from the following proposition
due to Martin.
Proposition 5.6 (Martin). Assuming appropriate determinacy hypotheses, if F
is a degree invariant function from reals to (presentations of) ordinals such that
F pAq ď ωA1 , then either F is constant on a cone or F pAq “ ω
A
1 on a cone.
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One could also consider the analogous relation given by replacing hyperarithmetic
reducibility and the hyperjump with Turing reducibility and the Turing jump.
Namely, define ăT by A ăT B iff A
1 ďT B. By results of Harrison (see [4]),
this relation is not well-founded. However, it is well-founded if we restrict ourselves
to the hyperarithmetic reals, as shown by Putnam and Enderton in [2]. In that
paper, Putnam and Enderton also show that the rank of a hyperarithmetic real
A in this relation is “within 2” of the least α such that A cannot compute 0pαq.
More precisely, if the rank of A is α then A cannot compute 0pα`1q and if A cannot
compute 0pαq then the rank of A is at most α` 2.
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